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Abstract 
The Greek medical profession played an important role at the start of the Greek NHS (National 
Health System) in 1983 and became intrinsic to its later development.  In particular, junior 
hospital doctors firmly established their position and rights as a result of the new NHS. Using 
archival sources and interviews with elite participants, this article investigates the specific 
patterns of power and influence that Greek NHS doctors have exerted from the establishment of 
the Greek NHS through the latest major attempt at reform in 2001 to the present. Hospital 
doctors, in particular, have been able consistently to resist any health care system reforms that 
might affect their dominant position. Their unchallenged position in the system derives from 
both the particularities of the Greek state and society (in particular, the former‟s founding 
institutional arrangements and the latter‟s clientelistic social relations), and the key role that 
junior doctors played in the early stages of the Greek NHS. As a result, the system is highly „path 
dependent‟ in that the initial implementation of the NHS during the 1980s ensured that 
subsequent reforms consistently favoured medical self-interest. While challenges to the 
unaccountable power of the medical profession have emerged in Greece following the financial 
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crisis of 2009, including the beginnings of a popular critique of the medical profession, it is too 
soon to tell whether these will succeed in bringing about significant change. 
Keywords: Greek NHS Doctors, Medical Profession, Trade Unionism, Health Politics, Power 
and Influence 
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Introduction 
Greece has embarked upon three major health care system reforms since the restoration of 
democracy in 1974: in 1983–19861, 1992-19942 and 20013. In all three cases, there has been a 
large gap between the goals of the reforms and their implementation in practice.   
In 1983, key provisions of the socialist PASOK (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement) 
government‟s reforms under Health Minister Paraskevas Avgerinos (i.e. setting up a system of 
primary health care, establishing a unified health insurance fund, hospital doctors‟ full-time and 
exclusive practice in the public system, the requirement for university doctors to choose either 
private practice or National Health System (NHS) (public) practice and decentralization through 
regional health systems) failed to be implemented.   
In 1992, the Conservatives, under Health Minister Georgios Sourlas, focused on individual 
responsibility for health care, a shift from public to private provision and from public to private 
finance of health care. Elements in the Conservatives‟ plan were dedicated once again to 
reforming labour relations with the medical profession, such as introducing non-permanent 
tenure and part-time posts for public hospital doctors, and requiring university doctors to choose 
between university employment and full-time work for the Greek NHS. In addition, the 
Government attempted to tackle the issue of informal payments from patients to doctors, 
especially within the public hospital sector. The majority of the reforms, especially those 
affecting doctors‟ labour relations, were never realized in the face of strong public disapproval of 
the changes and doctors‟ unwillingness to comply with their new working conditions. 
PASOK‟s 2001 reform plan, under Health Minister Alekos Papadopoulos, established 17 
regional health authorities to enable redistribution of resources to under-served areas. However, 
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without the unification of the health insurance funds, the establishment of a primary health care 
system and the removal of traditional clientelistic party politics, this decentralization of the 
Greek NHS could not be implemented. As far as doctors‟ labour relations were concerned, 
Minister Papadopoulos attempted to tackle once and for all the lack of medical accountability 
and related medical dominance, but became embroiled in a fierce clash with the hospital doctors, 
especially the university doctors over reducing or abolishing private practice, which ended with 
his forced resignation and replacement by a more amenable minister who reversed most of the 
reforms in medical labour relations.  
The failure of all three sets of reforms indicates that the Greek medical profession was able to 
resist state influence over matters such as the number and distribution of medical staff in the 
NHS across the country, and methods of reimbursement and accountability, and highlights their 
power. Hence, today there are relatively large numbers of physicians per capita in Greece, mal-
distributed geographically (see Tables 1 and 2)
4
.  Physicians continue to receive informal 
payments and are not subject to any kind of effective external control over the services they 
deliver. The combination of salary in a budget-limited public system with extensive private fee-
for-service opportunities and lack of oversight over their working hours within the NHS, 
encourages doctors to minimize their effort in the public sector and maximize their time in the 
private sector contrary to the goals of the public system. The continuing large numbers of 
doctors, on the one hand, and increasingly restricted NHS resources, on the other, also explain 
why it has been so difficult to find a method and level of public reimbursement to meet doctors‟ 
expectations. This, in turn, has perpetuated and encouraged the receipt of informal payments. 
Informal payments reflect the inability of the Greek state to establish comprehensive coverage of 
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the population, the fragmented way health insurance coverage has developed (favouring 
privileged groups, such as the liberal professions and civil servants,  which, in turn, reflects the 
unequal distribution of power within Greek society), the desire of doctors for supplementary 
income, and patients‟ willingness to  give doctors informal payments in the expectation that this 
will ensure that doctors provide them with good treatment. This harms poorer public patients‟ 
access to public services, in particular, since they have to pay out-of-pocket for care that should 
be free out of their limited incomes. The public is generally dissatisfied with the health care 
system
4, dissatisfaction which may explain successive governments‟ efforts to reform the system 
and their ensuing clashes with various segments of the medical profession
5
. 
Though there is already some literature on the Greek medical profession and successive Greek 
NHS reforms 
6-8
, it dwells on the detail of reform legislation and is reliant on secondary sources.   
In particular, little attention has been given to explaining precisely how the medical profession 
has been able to block or limit each set of reforms when these threatened to weaken its 
dominance and privileges.     
By contrast, the current analysis uses extensive primary data, informed by insights from 
structural  interest theory (in which the health care arena and its dynamics are defined by 
conflicts between the three fundamental-structural interests of the medical profession, managers 
and the community as -patients)
9
, the sociology of the professions (according to which once the 
medical profession has established its professional autonomy, it is then uniquely well positioned 
as a political lobby group to protect its position from challenge)
10
 and historical institutionalism  
(which explains  how, in conflicts between rival groups for scarce resources, institutions (formal 
or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational 
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structure of the polity and the political economy) are likely systematically to favor some interests 
and disadvantage others)
11
 critically to explain the largely unchallenged position of hospital 
doctors, in particular, in the NHS.  
Methods 
This qualitative research uses two primary data sources:  analysis of Greek documents related to 
health care system reforms; and elite interviews with reform participants. Documentary analysis 
included government documents, parliamentary reports, position papers of medical societies and 
trade unions, and publications of other interest groups in health care, together with contemporary 
accounts in newspapers and periodicals.  Semi-structured interviews were undertaken to tease 
out the role and influence of different interest groups on the origins and implementation of the 
reforms. The interviewees were identified initially from documents and previous accounts of the 
three major health care reforms, supplemented by those whose names were mentioned in 
interviews.  This  identified the main interest groups involved (i.e. academics/health policy 
experts, ministers of health or interested politicians, health bureaucrats, trade unionists, 
associations  of university and other doctors,  and journalists), their interests (i.e. goals, motives, 
strategies), and their  formal and informal alliances
12
. The interviewees were mainly former 
health ministers, former presidents of medical associations and MPs.  Interviews were 
undertaken face-to-face, using a checklist of questions which was adjusted according to the role 
of each informant. Thirty-seven interviews (12 for the 1983 reform, 11 for the 1992 reform and 
14 for the 2001 reform) were digitally recorded and transcribed. Interviews lasted between half 
an hour, and one and half hours. Interviews took place in informants‟ offices, homes, or 
wherever they felt comfortable to speak. 
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All the interviewees gave informed, written consent to participate in the research. Some 
interviewees were willing to be identified though all were offered anonymity.  Interviewees are 
described only in terms of their broad organisational affiliation to help reader comprehension. . 
Whenever it was requested, a copy of the transcribed interview was provided allowing the 
interviewee to correct any potential misunderstanding of what they had intended to say
13
. 
Interviews were analysed thematically and quotations are used to encapsulate important themes.  
These included the roles of collaborating medical representative bodies, of clientelistic 
relationships, and of legislative or electoral influence in preserving access to informal payments 
and resistance to external appraisals, that persisted throughout the period from 1983 to 2001. 
Each key theme (e.g. collaborative medical bodies such as EINAP, ISA, PIS) was then displayed 
or charted in its own matrix, where every respondent was allocated a row and each column 
denoted a separate subtopic, such as, their power and influence within the medical profession, 
their role in each health care reform, their political affiliations, their tactics towards the planning 
and the implementation of the reforms, and their alliances or their rivalries. The sources of data 
were used iteratively during the analysis, for example, moving backwards and forwards between 
the documents and interviews without assuming that either source should be given greater weight 
but that taken together they could provide a fuller account than a single source. The following 
sections are organised around the aforementioned themes. The protocol and related 
documentation were approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (Application Number: 2079, Approval Date: 5th January 2005). 
Results 
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1980s: the early claims of hospital doctors become embedded in the newly established 
Greek NHS 
From the late 1970s to the late 1980s, medical trade unionism was synonymous with EINAP 
(Athens – Piraeus Hospital Doctors‟ Trade Union), established in 1976. During the late 1970s, 
EINAP rapidly became a very powerful trade union representing junior doctors (hospital doctors 
in specialist training) whose interests were suppressed by dominant senior doctors (the hospital 
specialists or „consultants‟).  Junior doctors could become seniors after they had finished their 
specialty training only if a relevant post in a hospital was created or became available following 
a decision by the head consultant of a hospital specialty or the management committee of a 
hospital. Thus, junior doctors were heavily dependent for their future careers on their 
relationships with their superiors and with the administration of the hospital.  
Senior and junior doctors had rival aspirations for the new Greek NHS. The senior hospital 
doctors wanted to protect and expand their interests by maintaining their right to pursue parallel 
public and private practice. Junior doctors, who were not allowed to practise privately and were 
poorly paid without a secure career path, saw the implementation of the NHS as a unique 
opportunity to avoid the authoritarian control of senior doctors, achieve more secure careers and 
obtain similarly generous salaries that far exceeded those of ordinary public servants (eventually, 
they obtained salaries roughly two and a half times greater). The senior doctors wanted to control 
the new system introduced by the PASOK government, and were against being forced to practise 
full-time and exclusively in the public hospitals, arguing that this was Marxist totalitarianism 
contrary to their human rights. For example, Dr. Halazonitis, former president of ISA (Athens 
Medical Society) (affiliated with the Conservatives), accused the government of producing a 
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plan that satisfied the needs of the junior hospital doctors and left the senior hospital doctors 
financially disadvantaged
14
.  
Although senior and junior doctors had different aspirations for the new system, they appeared to 
be united in demanding a more organized system. However, even if the majority of the medical 
profession (professional societies and trade unions) was in favour of a NHS, in principle, it did 
not support the specific proposals and did not trust the government. A senior official of ISA 
(representing over half of the Greek medical profession) vividly described in his interview junior 
doctors‟ views at the time: “It is about time that the State recognizes the difficulty, the 
responsibility and high mission of the medical profession and reimburses it with a wage plan 
specifically tailored to its needs’’. Another of his colleagues summarized the medical 
profession‟s position at the time in one sentence, “Everything that it is good for doctors is good 
for the public health and for the Greek people”. 
Behind the profession‟s support for further improvement of the health care system in the public 
interest, there lay an agenda focused on advancing the profession‟s own interests in terms of 
wages, working conditions and training 
15
.  
During the parliamentary debate on the Greek NHS Bill in 1983, the political opposition was 
strengthened by the position adopted by the medical associations, which had argued that the 
transformation of doctors into employees with permanent tenure would create a medical 
proletariat 
16
.  Unions of specialists and senior doctors affiliated to the Conservative Party-New 
Democracy strongly criticized “the way the government promoted one part of the medical 
profession [i.e. junior doctors], in order to secure its support during the implementation of the 
NHS”.17  The Pan-Hellenic Union of Specialists argued that doctors would have to practise under 
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a „police state‟, and that the state was planning to violate doctors‟ professional autonomy 18. 
Specialists characterized the Bill as “bossy, tough, inflexible and inapplicable to Greek reality”. 
17
 Former Conservative Minister of Health, Spyridon Doxiadis, argued that the Bill transformed 
doctors into “a bunch of checkers that are ruled by the State and possibly by political parties”. 19  
EINAP‟s representatives, however, supported the idea of permanent tenure for hospital doctors, 
but opposed the Bill for different reasons, arguing that the government had manipulated EINAP 
to isolate, divide and weaken the medical profession. ISA and non-hospital doctors were also 
concerned about the same issues 
20
.  
Nonetheless, the Greek NHS Bill became Law 1397/1983 in September 1983, but there were 
signs from a very early stage of sabotage by the hospital doctors, as soon as the Minister tried to 
implement the legislation decentralizing the system and requiring doctors to work in under-
doctored regions.  To this end, Health Minister Avgerinos attempted to establish so-called 
„institutional hospital doctor posts‟.  In response, junior and senior doctors went on strike with 
the support of EINAP, despite the fact that the representatives of EINAP were overall politically 
aligned with the Socialists, supported Avgerinos, and blamed the Conservatives and the 
representatives of the Greek Left for trying to undermine the NHS Law for contrasting reasons. 
On 17
th
 January 1984, Avgerinos resigned, accusing hospital doctors of burying the recent 
reforms and saying that the strike was illegal, prompting the Administrative Hospital Councils to 
prosecute the hospital doctors who had participated in the strike. EINAP was outraged by the 
prosecution of its members, and this action united doctors against Avgerinos. As one of its 
executive committee members at that time stated in the daily newspaper H KATHIMERINI , 
“Hospital doctors are the ones that can implement the Law and support the newly born Greek 
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NHS”. 21 The doctors were able to use the argument that without their support, it would be 
impossible for the new Greek NHS to function, in order to pursue their own interests.  In 
addition, EINAP expressed its desire for a NHS that was “friendly to the patients, but also to the 
doctors” 22 and, as one of its senior officials at that time stated in his interview, hospital doctors 
wanted to reassure the public that “whenever they hear that doctors are on strike, they are 
fighting against something wrong that harms Greek society in general and not only doctors” .  
The public was largely convinced by these arguments and supported the doctors‟ resistance to 
the government‟s plans. 
Under this kind of sustained pressure, the next Health Minister, Georgios Gennimatas, 
surrendered to the claims of the hospital doctors. The government feared that doctors, 
particularly the senior doctors, would not join the NHS and that PASOK would thus not be able 
to fulfil one of its most prominent plans for the transformation of Greek society. 
As a result, Health Minister Gennimatas immediately acknowledged the hospital doctors‟ 
demands and declared his opposition to the attempt of Avgerinos and KESY (the Central Health 
Council) to encourage doctors to practise in the under-doctored countryside, by introducing 
supplementary legislation to Law 1397/1983 (Law 1579/1983) preserving the freedom of doctors 
to practise in the big cities (see Table 2).  In addition, public hospital doctors who had failed their 
NHS assessment of competence were eventually allowed to remain in post within the new 
system despite government plans to the contrary.                                                            
The Ministry of Health then resorted to a different approach to tackling the problem of the mal-
distribution of doctors by employing additional private specialists in the regions, but without any 
prior appraisal of their qualifications.  Law 1579/1985 also increased doctors‟ reimbursement for 
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„active service‟ (referred to as „nominal overtime pay‟ in the Greek NHS) 23-27.  The 
government‟s actions in this period had an immediate and long-term effect on hospital doctor 
numbers and their vested interests. First, the number of doctors that entered the Greek NHS  
doubled (from the 3200 that Avgerinos had initially proposed to over 7000 by 1986), and second, 
this increase enabled the medical profession to form a solid and powerful interest group within 
the Greek NHS whose support no political party could afford to lose.    
The change in Avgerinos‟ plan for the Greek NHS brought about by his successor, Health 
Minister Gennimatas, was striking. He praised the role of the hospital doctors, saying that 
“….hospital doctors in the NHS are poorly paid, and as a result they mistrust [the NHS]. This 
should change…doctors have to regain their trust in the system”. 28 Unfortunately, Gennimatas 
did not appreciate the future problems surrounding the control of doctors‟ labour relations that 
this deferential attitude would provoke. As a result, hospital doctors started to break even the 
diluted NHS Law by continuing to receive informal payments and undertaking private practice 
when supposed to be working in the public system.  
The government might have strengthened its position vis-à-vis the medical profession had it tried 
to exploit the pre-existing divergence of interests between the medical societies (PIS and ISA, 
mainly representing private doctors) and the medical trade unions (principally EINAP, mainly 
representing doctors working in public hospitals in Athens and Piraeus).  However,  Gennimatas‟ 
strategy made it easy for the different representative bodies of the medical profession to support 
each other to protect the position of the profession as a whole 
29-30
. 
The victory of the hospital doctors was also based on the willingness and ability of the majority 
of the EINAP representatives to put aside their different party political affiliations.  The 
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Conservatives and the Socialists within EINAP united in finding a way of profiting whether they 
worked inside or outside the Greek NHS. For those inside, EINAP managed to negotiate a NHS 
moulded to their interests, thereby undermining the Greek NHS legislation that was the 
cornerstone of PASOK‟s policy. EINAP and the other medical bodies prevented the 
transformation of the health care system into a genuinely national system in 1983 through their 
closeness to the centres of political decision-making 
31
.   
1990s: evolution of hospital doctors’ authority through parliamentary influence on their 
access to informal payments and their resistance to external appraisals    
As in 1983-86, at crucial moments in the 1992 reforms, EINAP mobilized its members to 
undertake industrial action across political party lines when important aspects of the position of 
hospital doctors was threatened. In addition, the hospital doctors‟ main trade union enjoyed 
public support in their conflict with the government. Hospital doctors became particularly 
concerned with any attempt by the state to restrict their clinical autonomy or abolish rights to 
permanent employment. Facing such threats, hospital doctors became strongly loyal to their trade 
union (EINAP) and, helped by the overarching Civil Service Trade Union (ADEDY), fought 
collectively for their interests.  The experience of this period showed that the medical profession 
was adept at resisting reforms whether coming from the right or the left of the political spectrum.  
In 1992, the new Conservative government‟s neoliberal agenda (in contrast to the previous social 
democratic reforms) included the introduction of three different levels of employment for public 
hospital doctors - full-time, part-time, or paid per case - reflecting its support for more flexible 
terms of service throughout the civil service.  This was the Conservative government‟s route to 
tackle informal payments, which it saw as a fraud undermining the efficiency of public services.  
It was argued that part-time and paid per case contracts would enable hospital doctors to earn 
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additional legitimate income from private practice, replacing dependence on informal payments 
to supplement their earnings.  EINAP opposed the legislation arguing that the reforms risked 
harming access to decent hospital care.  In the event, only 492 hospital doctors  (out of 8,300) 
accepted contracts under the second or third mode, as they were sure that they could continue to 
work full time while receiving informal payments without fear of sanctions 
32-33
. When PASOK 
returned to power in October 1993, 330 of these doctors returned to full-time and exclusive 
tenure. A senior trade unionist of the period recounted at interview “…they got a quite bitter 
taste of what the private sector could offer them and decided to return to their safe and 
uninterrupted interests within the Greek  NHS….” In the end, the Conservative Minister Sourlas, 
failed to make fundamental changes in doctors‟ working practices. Hospital doctors employed by 
the state may have had different political affiliations (Socialists, Conservatives or the Left), but 
they had a strong and shared interest in preserving the status quo transcending party differences 
and refused to renegotiate their formal (permanent tenured posts, special payments, etc.) or 
informal (nominal overtime payments, informal payments, corrupted appraisal system, etc.) 
vested interests. 
Furthermore, they successfully exploited the fact that the rate of increase in NHS funding was 
lower than had been initially agreed in 1985, as justification for continuing or even increasing the 
frequency of informal payments in the face of measures designed to remove them.  In 1992, 
representatives of the most important medical trade unions and medical societies accepted 
responsibility to self-regulate informal payments.  They also agreed to release the results of their 
own investigation into informal payments to the Committee on Social Issues of the Greek 
Parliament which was investigating informal payments in response to public complaints. The 
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profession‟s report concluded that: a) the informal economy was a common, accepted feature of 
Greek society, including the health sector; b) doctors received informal payments principally 
because of poor salaries; and c) because of the peculiar, personal and very close relations 
between doctors and patients, some doctors would continue to be given gifts symbolic of 
patients‟ gratitude, irrespective of the level of their salaries. According to the Parliamentary 
Committee‟s report, informal payments were  „insignificant and within the limits of personal 
relations‟  32, and thus not something that should be the subject of further legal regulation.  
However, an earlier draft of the Committee‟s report had appeared in the daily newspaper, “TO 
VIMA”.  It had clearly stated that most hospital doctors encouraged informal payments. Two 
weeks later this was changed to state that only a few hospital doctors received informal 
payments, and that the payments were not initiated by the doctors - rather patients spontaneously 
offered them, or, as a senior journalist expressed it in his interview, “patients tempted doctors 
with them” .34  This was a view widely held outside the medical profession.  For example, a high 
ranking bureaucrat of the period argued at interview that the persistence of fakelaki (informal 
payment) was: “… a crime committed by two sides. There is an individual that gives the money 
and there is another individual that receives the money. As a result, we cannot put the blame on 
doctors who receive informal payments....”.  
The Parliamentary Committee‟s final report was further strongly influenced by the fact that all 
the members of the inter-party Committee were physicians unanimously supportive of the 
hospital doctors 
35
.  Unanimity among Greek parliamentarians is rare, so it seems that the Greek 
doctors‟ lobby had again managed to transcend party politics 35. 
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The Committee‟s conclusion that patients were to blame for informal payments protected 
hospital doctors from future accusations of impropriety. The inability of the state to properly 
implement and monitor regulations regarding doctors‟ working practices, the exploitation of 
these dysfunctional institutional arrangements by NHS doctors and the strong representation of 
doctors in, and their intimate connections to, the Greek Parliament, together explain how the 
Committee‟s report was able to be manipulated in favour of the status quo. It was no coincidence 
that in 1992, 48 of the 300 MPs were from the medical profession and that they were so well 
represented on the Committee investigating informal payments. As the daily newspaper, TO 
VIMA, argued, the MPs on the Committee acted first as doctors and only second as 
representatives of the Greek people 
34, 36
.   
As well as successfully resisting any external regulation of informal payments during the early 
1990s, hospital doctors were also able to resist any kind of external appraisal of the quality of 
their clinical work. The roots of their ability to avoid external appraisal lay in Health Minister 
Gennimatas‟ plan in the 1980s to build a solid bloc of vested medical interests in support of the 
institution of the Greek NHS, designed to remove any threat that successor governments might 
try to abolish the new system. As a result, the state was able to build a strong Greek NHS, at 
least at the start, but, at the same time, an institution subordinated to the interests of the Greek 
medical profession. As a result, when the Conservative government tried in 1991 to introduce a 
system of independent audit specifically to investigate if hospital doctors were fulfilling their 
„overtime active duty‟, this was fiercely and successfully resisted. For example, at one public 
hospital, not a single doctor was on duty when the auditors arrived.  Later, the doctors appeared 
and forced the auditors to leave the hospital 
37
.  
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2001: hospital doctors’ continuing demonstration of their power and influence  
In 2001, the PASOK Health Minister, Alekos Papadopoulos, proposed further reforms designed 
to challenge vested medical interests in the Greek health care system.  As a previously successful 
Minister of Finance, Papadopoulos was sufficiently ambitious to believe that he could tackle the 
long standing problems of the Greek health care system.  He also believed that it would be 
possible to transcend old style party politics in pursuit of his reforms. His proposals included the 
development of 17 decentralized Regional Health Systems, new managerial structures within the 
public hospitals, modification of the terms of employment of the Greek NHS and university 
doctors, and 24-hour opening of the public hospitals, with afternoon outpatient clinics, where 
doctors could treat their private patients on site on a fee-for-service basis so that more of the 
doctors‟ private practice would take place where it could be observed and any shirking of public 
responsibilities would be more visible. In addition, a percentage of the doctors‟ fees would be 
shared with the public hospital.  Finally, hospitals were to become accountable to the appropriate 
Regional Health System rather than remaining part of central government and the civil service. 
Presenting itself as the guardian of the public interest, EINAP opposed the 2001 plan on the 
grounds that “it promotes the private health sector and damages the social and public character 
of the system”, arguing somewhat tendentiously that the introduction of managers in  public 
hospitals, the introduction of a unified insurance health fund, which was intended to be a private 
not for profit entity and not a public one (ODIPY), and the afternoon private outpatient clinics in 
the public hospitals, where patients had to pay for the doctor‟s time, amounted to wholesale 
privatization. Its President, Dr. Stathis Tsoukalos, argued that the plan gave the misleading 
impression that up to now there had been total chaos in the Greek health care system, when, in 
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fact, Greece had scored relatively well in a recent WHO global ranking of health care systems 
(achieving 14
th
 place in 2000) 
38. In addition, as another member of EINAP‟s executive 
committee argued at interview, hospital doctors had warned the Minister that, although 
reforming legislation had been passed previously, much of it had remained a „dead letter‟, 
“….there are many examples from the recent history of the Greek NHS where a minister has 
introduced various Laws but none of these were implemented…….”. Dr. Stathis Tsoukalos and 
Dr. Giannis Eleutheriou, member of the administrative committee of EINAP and treasurer of 
ISA, respectively, threatened that hospital doctors would not accept any change to their working 
conditions, and would expect a generous increase in health care expenditure in return for the 
implementation of any other reforms to the system 
39
. Representatives of  EINAP were 
particularly against the introduction of professional hospital managers, arguing that as managers 
were not doctors they did not have the clinical knowledge and thus authority to judge any aspect 
of doctors‟ work (one MP who was also a doctor argued in his interview that “doctors should be 
judged only by doctors”). Finally, hospital doctors opposed the reforms on the grounds that 
Minister Papadopoulos was attempting to abolish EINAP members‟ permanent status as civil 
servants within the Greek NHS and to make them accountable instead to the 17 Regional Health 
Systems, so that the Regions could allocate the medical work force more efficiently. The civil 
service union, ADEDY, backed EINAP in its effort to resist this change. ADEDY had intervened 
periodically in favour of the interests of public hospital doctors, as ADEDY representatives knew 
that if doctors became subject to regional health authorities, this would set a precedent for other 
personnel to be moved out of the civil service and might weaken the position of ADEDY.  
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 Public opinion was not uniformly in favour of the medical status quo in this period and the lack 
of medical accountability was increasing citizens‟ mistrust of the system, encouraging the view 
that doctors enjoyed a network of esoteric guild protection 
40
. Nonetheless, while public mistrust 
of the Greek medical profession rose still further during the 2000s, this did nothing to erode the 
clientelism which marked the doctor-patient relationship (which had its roots in party political 
clientelism) 
41-42
   This continued to be exploited by doctors, for example, to influence their 
patients‟ voting patterns in favour of themselves or their political parties. As a senior hospital 
doctor argued at interview, “there are a lot of Greek citizens who voted for me, who were not 
members or supporters of my party, PASOK.  This occurred because I was their doctor and they 
felt obliged because I treated their children”. In other cases, doctors running for Parliament 
treated patients for free to obtain their votes. 
As far as informal payments were concerned, the representatives of the medical profession 
continued to downplay their extent, and where they existed, argued that they were due to poor 
pay and were initiated consistently by patients.  As a result, according to Liaropoulos et al. 
43
,  
the majority of public hospital doctors still receive informal payments (only 4% of NHS hospital 
doctors denied receiving informal payments in 2008), despite the fact that Law 3745/2009 puts 
hospital doctors at the top of the civil servants‟ pay scale 44-45. A rough calculation of the 
additional informal income of each Greek NHS doctor is around 7,300 Euros per year or a third 
of the official average salary of a public hospital doctor (assuming that there were 27,386 NHS 
hospital doctors) 
46
. There are NHS doctors who do not receive or accept any informal payments 
and, at the other extreme, cases of NHS doctors whose illegal income far exceeds their official 
salary 
48
.   
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Discussion 
Until 25 years ago, there had been very little research interest in Greece in public policy, 
including in the health field. During the 1990s, researchers started to look at health policy and 
reforms 
47-49
. Scholars such as Venieris 
6
 and Mossialos 
50-51
 evaluated  how the reforms of the 
Greek NHS (1983-2001) had affected funding and service provision. In addition, Carlos 
52
 and 
Guillen 
53
 adopted a Southern European comparative welfare state perspective to explain why 
countries like Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece had decided to implement NHSs during the 
1980s. They argued that the role of the medical profession was crucial in the implementation of 
these reforms, but  they did not seek to explain in detail using primary data how the profession 
was able to exert so much influence to frustrate reformers from both left and right wing political 
persuasions. 
This article reinforces the centrality of the medical profession in shaping the Greek NHS, but 
advances understanding by showing how medical interests were both affected by the 
establishment of the Greek NHS and at the same time strengthened by the new NHS.  In turn, 
this shaped future medical trade unionism, allowing medical interests to organise working 
practices and methods of reimbursement to suit themselves rather than the interests of patients or 
tax payers.  The incomplete implementation of the original plans for the Greek NHS, in turn, 
became an impediment to any future reform - a typical example of path dependency. Mahoney 
explains  path dependency as a situation where  “an institutional pattern - once adopted - 
delivers increasing returns with its continued adoption, and thus over time it becomes more and 
more difficult to transform the pattern or select previously available options, even if these 
alternative options would have been more efficient” 54:508. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [A
tha
na
sio
s N
iko
len
tzo
s] 
at 
08
:28
 26
 A
pr
il 2
01
6 
 21 
 
The plans for the establishment of the Greek NHS provoked major conflict between the medical 
profession and the state in 1983, as in most other Western European countries when tax financed 
systems were first introduced 
11, 55
. In the Greek case, conflicts varied from the ideological 
(between the Socialists and the Conservatives), to the intra-professional (between different 
segments of the medical profession such as junior versus senior doctors). However, what 
emerged was the accommodation of the medical profession‟s collective interests by the state 
during the Parliamentary debates of 1983 and subsequently during the early period of Greek 
NHS implementation (1985-1986). The government was unable to safeguard the principles 
underlying the Greek NHS against the self-interest of the various sub-groups within the medical 
profession. Policy implementation is the most vulnerable part of the policy process to 
discrepancies between what the law stipulates and what happens in practice (so called 
„formalism‟ (which refers to the tendency to focus more on the form of legislation than its 
implementation, and to distract attention from substantial to trivial problems) which is prevalent 
in most Southern European countries and particularly in Greece 
56-57
. There were several 
manifestations of „formalism‟ during the implementation of the Greek NHS, particularly the 
requirements in the initial legislation for university doctors to quit private practice, public 
hospital doctors to practise full time and exclusively in the public sector, hospital doctors to be 
properly appraised, doctors to refuse informal payments and the unification of the health 
insurance funds. All these remained unfulfilled. As Mouzelis 
56
 argues, Greek political and 
cultural life has been dominated by formalism, thereby sacrificing substantive change (which 
would be predominantly in the interest of underprivileged groups) to formal change (generally in 
the interest of privileged groups). Seen from this perspective, the establishment of the Greek 
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NHS did not change the status quo in many respects.  On the contrary, it served to strengthen the 
hegemony of the medical profession, including for the first time the junior doctors.  
This was highlighted by the maintenance of personal, clientelistic relations with patients and 
with governments. Clientelistic relations with governments were enabled and maintained through 
the strong representation of doctors in the Greek Parliament where they formed a coherent lobby, 
together with their ability to mobilise voter opinion in their favour. Since the restoration of 
democracy in 1974, successive Greek governments have been vulnerable to the medical 
profession‟s demands because of the potential political cost of voter mobilization against the 
government if doctors as a profession are unhappy with particular policies. This has been 
reinforced by the predominance of doctors as Ministers of Health and their tendency to be drawn 
from the ranks of either successful private doctors with strong local community support or 
prestigious university doctors. Doctors have long been strongly represented in the Greek 
Parliament. This was particularly evident in the 1992 reform period when 48 out of the 300 MPs 
were doctors, again in the early 2000s and continues to be the case.  For example, in the 2004 
general election, after lawyers, doctors formed the second biggest and most powerful grouping in 
the Greek Parliament.  The same occurred in 2009.  
The persistence of path dependent reform without change suggests that only a powerful external 
„shock‟ is likely to alter the Greek health care system.  The 2009 Greek debt crisis would appear 
to have offered just such a „shock‟.  Between 2001 and 2009 health system reform was off the 
government agenda.  By contrast, the response to the debt crisis included proposed reforms with 
the potential to challenge the hegemony of the medical profession. However, the incomplete 
implementation of the first two reform memoranda dictated by the Troika of European 
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Commission, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank (the group of 
international lenders that laid down stringent austerity measures to be followed by the Greek 
government in return for loans) has shown that, even in a period of crisis, both the government 
and the lenders prefer more easily implemented changes such as across the board cuts in public 
spending  over structural reforms designed to improve efficiency since such reforms risk 
disturbing the vested interests of the privileged parts of Greek society.  
It is no coincidence that the Troika could only bring about  major budget cuts in pharmaceuticals 
(public spending on pharmaceuticals fell from 5.6 billion Euros in 2009 to 2 billion Euros in 
2014
58
) , some restructuring of hospital clinics 
59
 and some initial plans for a better organized 
primary health care system (though these are once again yet to be realized at the time of writing 
in March 2016)
60
. The focus on crude budget cuts has, if anything, reinforced the persistence of 
informal payments, bribes and the lack of scrutiny of hospital doctors. Two reports, the first by a 
private polling company called Public Issue
61
 and the second by the General Inspector of Public 
Administration
62
  have both shown that hospitals and hospital doctors are still at the forefront of 
informal payments and bribes. Senior doctors argue that this is justified by the cuts to their 
wages since the beginning of the debt crisis. However, this does not explain why informal 
payments were common place before the crisis.  It is also inconsistent with the fact that hospital 
doctors enjoy relatively high, protected salaries (along with judges, MPs, academics, the military 
and the clergy) and that just before the debt crisis they had obtained a 40% increase in their basic 
salaries. This means that the majority of hospital doctors are currently paid at their 2004 level, 
while the salaries of the majority of civil servants have fallen to the level of the late 1990s due to 
public spending cuts following the debt crisis 
63-65
. 
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Junior doctors who have not secured a post within the Greek NHS have fared less well since the 
debt crisis and a number have left to follow a career outside Greece. Faced with budget cuts, 
lower than expected wages, continuing corruption and reliance on informal payments, they feel 
insecure about their futures.  However, there are also more recent signs of contrary trends.  For 
example, starting in  2015, there has been an unexpected return of young professionals, 
entrepreneurs and even doctors to Greece to seek job opportunities
66
. For example, as large parts 
of the publicly financed system have collapsed, so opportunities have grown in private practice 
(e.g. in psychiatry).  
So far, it seems that, despite the partial implementation of the Troika‟s first two reform 
memoranda, the ability of the state to bring about the necessary structural changes, both more 
widely and within the health care system, designed to establish a new social contract with the 
people has been further weakened. Politicians have proved unable to use the crisis as an 
instrument to limit the prerogatives of the medical profession. This is indicative of the influence 
of broader institutional patterns present since the 19
th
 century on the evolution of the Greek 
Welfare State 
67
 . 
However, there are tentative signs that external pressures for change may yet serve to shake up 
the path dependent nature of the health care system.  First, in the summer of 2015, under the 
pressure of the Troika, Greece signed a third reform memorandum which dictated potentially 
important structural reforms to social insurance, and increased flexibility and competition in the 
markets for the services of professionals such as lawyers, notaries and pharmacists. Such 
developments, if implemented, could have significant implications for the medical profession.  
Second, there are early signs of a change in public awareness of, and sentiment towards, the 
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perpetuation of a privileged oligarchy which includes the medical profession, driven by the 
extreme humanitarian crisis.  More than the incomplete implementation of the previous two 
reform memoranda, the effects of the crisis have forced a growing realization among ordinary 
members of the public that their individualism and support for clientelism have not served their 
best interests.  Through their novel participation in collective movements outside formal state 
institutions (e.g. local community medical services, food banks, Third Sector legal assistance, 
independent local food markets, etc.), the population has begun to organize and act beyond the 
reach of the hegemonic vested interests of Greek society.  These initiatives are based on the 
principles of participatory democracy and local empowerment.  In the health care arena, they can 
be found in the activities of independent groups exposing hospital doctors who accept informal 
payments.  However, the courts are also beginning to act against tax evasion by doctors, 
including their receipt of informal payments, and to patients against medical malpractice. 
Whether these early signs of patient and public empowerment, and maturity in relations with the 
medical profession become the foundation for challenging the medical profession‟s hegemony 
remains to be seen. However, challenging doctors‟ status and immunity from accountability are 
important steps towards re-evaluating how the principles, aims and objectives of the Greek NHS 
are to be realized in practice. They could lead gradually to the NHS‟ transformation. 
However, in order to make genuine progress with key reforms, such as a better organized 
primary care system able to relieve some of the demand for hospital care and contribute to the 
Troika‟s demands for curbs on public spending, a high level of political consensus is required, or 
at least the ability to compromise among the groups whose support is necessary to implement 
changes, many of whom potentially stand to lose, at least in the short term. In addition, a strong 
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state, with a politically neutral bureaucratic elite is needed to sustain reform implementation.  
Unfortunately, no sustained consensus was achieved in 1983, and there has been no sustained 
public pressure in favour of significant health sector reform where this affects the prerogatives of 
the medical profession. 
Conclusion 
Hospital doctors, in particular, have been able consistently to resist any health care system 
reforms that might affect the dominant position of the medical profession in the Greek NHS. 
Their unchallenged position in the system derives from both the particularities of the Greek state 
and society (in particular, the former‟s founding institutional arrangements and the latter‟s 
clientelistic social relations), and the key role that junior doctors played in the early stages of the 
Greek NHS after 1983. As a result, the system is highly „path dependent‟ in that the initial 
implementation of the Greek NHS during the 1980s ensured that subsequent reforms consistently 
favoured medical self-interest. While challenges to the unaccountable power of the medical 
profession have emerged in Greece following the financial crisis of 2009, including the 
beginnings of a popular critique of the medical profession, it is too soon to tell whether these will 
succeed in bringing about significant change. 
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Table 1: Personnel employed by Greek NHS Hospitals, 1999-2009  
 
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 
Total pubic 
hospital 
employment 
77,382 80,701 86,157 84,734 84,643 87,085 
Physicians  22,698 24,424 24,227 25,573 25,965 27,386 
Nurses, 
midwives, health 
care assistants 
and other staff  
47,631 51,027 55,216 54,656 55,448 57,474 
Administrative 
staff 
7,053 5,250 6,714 4,505 3,230 2,225 
Source: (OECD, 2015) 
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Table 2: Number of doctors by geographical area, 1974 - 1997
1
 
 
Years Greece Total Greater Athens Thessalonica Rest of Greece 
1974 17,942 10,342 2,736 4,864 
1979 22,337 12,736 3,414 6,187 
1984  28,212 15,486 4,297 8,429 
1990 34,336 17,418 5,521 11,397 
 
                                                 
1
 Source: Social Welfare and Health Statistics, 1970 – 2001, and National Statistics, 2001, National Statistical 
Service of Greece. (ESYE) 
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